Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 1 The	Rationality	of	Perception Susanna	Siegel To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica Overview The	main	thesis	of	The	Rationality	of	Perception	is	that	both	perceptual	experiences and	the	processes	that	give	rise	to	them	can	be	rational	or	irrational.	If	the Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	is	true,	then	experiences	themselves	can	manifest	an epistemic	status.	I	call	that	status	"epistemic	charge". On	the	traditional	view,	perceptual	experiences	are	not	the	kinds	of	things	that	can have	an	epistemic	status	or	redound	well	or	badly	on	the	subject.	The	nature	of perceptual	experiences,	on	this	view,	precludes	them	from	manifesting	any epistemic	status,	and	in	this	respect	they	are	fundamentally	different	from	beliefs.	If the	traditional	view	is	wrong,	then	it	will	be	most	visibly	wrong	in	cases	where experiences	are	epistemically	compromised,	as	experiences	that	are	rational	or	arational	would	play	of	the	same	epistemic	roles	in	supporting	beliefs.	For	this reason,	in	making	my	case	against	the	traditional	view,	I	focus	primarily	on	cases where	things	go	epistemically	wrong. I	motivate	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	with	a	range	of	cases	designed	to illustrate	epistemically	flawed	routes	to	experience.	Jill	fears	that	Jack	is	angry	with her,	and	her	fearful	suspicion	influences	the	way	Jack	looks	to	her	when	she	sees him.	She	ends	up	with	a	visual	experience	that	presents	Jack	as	angry.	Vivek	is	an overconfident	performer,	and	the	faces	in	the	audience	look	pleased	to	him	even when	in	fact	most	people's	expression	are	neutral. The	cases	I	discuss	belong	to	a	two-pronged	strategy	in	defending	the	idea	that experiences	are	epistemically	appraisable.	The	first	step	is	to	argue	that	experiences are	made	epistemically	less	powerful	by	certain	forms	of	influence.	I	call	this	loss	of power	"epistemic	downgrade."	This	step	occurs	in	Chapter	4,	where	I	argue	that forms	of	influence	on	perceptual	experiences	illustrated	by	the	cases	of	Jill,	Vivek, and	others	that	lead	to	epistemic	downgrade.	The	second	step	in	the	strategy	is	to argue	that	the	epistemic	downgrade	can	be	explained	by	rational	relationships between	prior	outlooks	and	experiences,	and	here	I	focus	on	the	epistemic dependence	relationships	found	in	inference	(chapters	5-7). I	call	the	phenomena	highlighted	in	my	two-step	strategy	"perceptual	hijacking",	and the	first	three	chapters	introduce	these	phenomena	by	providing	tools	for	analyzing their	significance.	Perceptual	experiences	are	hijacked	when	they	arise	from processes	that	give	prior	outlooks	too	much	weight	in	determining	what	you experience,	and	fail	to	give	proper	weight	to	perceptual	inputs,	if	there	are	any. Some	opponents	grant	that	hijacked	experiences	are	epistemically	downgraded,	but explain	the	downgrade	in	a	different	way	from	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis. Other	opponents	deny	that	hijacked	experiences	are	epistemically	downgraded,	but find	a	different	kind	of	epistemic	shortcoming	in	the	vicinity.	In	this	way,	the Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 2 epistemic	shortcomings	that	I	highlight	provide	traction	in	the	inquiry	into	the possible	epistemic	impact	of	prior	outlooks	on	experience. Cases	of	epistemic	shortcomings	play	an	important	role	in	my	discussions,	but	the Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	is	just	as	significant	for	cases	of	epistemic	success	as it	is	for	cases	of	epistemic	failure. Since	many	modes	of	influence	on	perceptual experience	by	prior	outlooks	do	not	result	in	epistemic	downgrade,	a	principle	is needed	to	distinguish	rational	from	irrational	uses	of	information	in	the	route	to perceptual	experiences. I	draw	this	distinction	by	appealing	to	inference.	This	inferentialist	version	of	the Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	distinguishes	rational	from	irrational	uses	of information	by	invoking	the	difference	between	inferences	that	produce	wellfounded	conclusions	and	inferences	that	produce	ill-founded	conclusions,	where	illfoundedness	and	well-foundedness	are	dimensions	of	justification,	rather	than measures	of	accuracy.	In	my	analysis	of	hijacked	experiences,	those	experiences	are ill-founded	conclusions	of	inferences. The	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	provides	a	framework	for	analyzing	both	routes to	experience	that	generate	knowledge	and	rational	belief,	and	routes	to	experience that	generate	false	and	unjustified	belief. Its	central	moral	is	that	experiences	are susceptible	to	rational	evaluation. What	does	the	epistemology	of	perception	look	like	if	the	Rationality	of	Perception thesis	is	correct?	Is	it	even	possible	to	give	a	coherent	epistemological	account,	in the	face	of	the	rightfully	powerful	inertial	resistance	to	this	idea	in	the	history	of analytic	philosophy?	Given	my	aim	to	locate	perceptual	experiences	squarely	in	the house	of	reason,	what's	needed	to	answer	these	questions	is	a	detailed	account	of how	experience	can	have,	gain,	or	lose	power,	as	a	result	of	their	relationships	to prior	outlooks.	A	proof	of	concept	is	needed,	and	to	provide	it,	I	focus	on inferentialist	routes	to	experience. The	main	conceit	of	the	Rationality	of	Perception	allows	other	forms	of	intelligence besides	inference	to	shape	perceptual	experience.	For	example,	two	chess	players could	focus	on	the	same	arrangement	of	pieces,	where	a	novice	player	sees	the arrangement	by	luck	while	the	expert	player	sees	it	because	her	perceptual	system has	become	attuned	to	clusters	of	pieces	that	afford	winning	moves	(Chase	and Simon	(1973)).	Here,	intelligence	is	manifested	in	the	route	by	which	perceptual attention	comes	to	be	distributed	as	it	is.	If	the	resulting	experience	generates rational	belief	or	knowledge	about	which	moves	are	afforded,	the	positive	epistemic charge	of	the	experience	is	due	in	part	to	the	background	knowledge	of	the	expert. Overall,	the	Rationality	of	Perception	lets	us	analyze	the	ways	that	perception	can	be integrated	with	intelligence,	and	the	epistemic	failures	and	successes	that	result. Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 3 Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 4 Perception	as	Guessing	vs.	Perception	as	Knowing: Replies	to	Clark	and Peacocke* I	thank	Andy	Clark	and	Christopher	Peacocke	for	writing	such	insightful commentaries	and	for	bringing	many	fundamental	issues	about	perception	into focus.	Clark	and	Peacocke	both	think	there	is	such	a	thing	as	perceptual	hijacking, and	each	offers	a	framework	for	analyzing	it	that	differs	from	mine.	Clark	analyzes perceptual	hijacking	using	a	broadly	Bayesian	model.	He	accepts	an	inferentialist Rationality	of	Perception	thesis,	but	holds	that	the	scope	of	perceptual	hijacking	is much	smaller	than	I	suggest.	By	contrast,	Peacocke	rejects	the	Rationality	of Perception	thesis	(and	therefore	the	inferentialist	version	of	it),	and	argues	that perceptual	hijacking	is	better	analyzed	in	terms	of	the	Factive	Theory. The	frameworks	offered	by	Clark	and	Peacocke	illuminate	fundamentally	different approaches	to	perception.	As	Clark	construes	it,	perception	is	the	result	of	guessing done	by	a	cognitive	system	that	draws	heavily	on	predictions -	"priors	and prejudice"	–	where	prejudice	is	not	always	a	bad	thing	((2016),	pp	14,	27).	In contrast,	as	Peacocke	construes	it,	perceptual	experience	is	fundamentally	a	route	to knowledge.	Since	you	can't	guess	that	p	if	you	know	that	p,	these	models	crystallize the	difference	between	approaches	to	perception	that	emphasize	"top-down" processing	from	prediction	(Clark)	as	opposed	to	emphasizing	the	ultimately "bottom-up"	control	by	the	facts	perceived	(Peacocke). Each	of	these	models	has	some	explaining	to	do.	Regarding	the	models	that emphasize	top-down	processing:	if	predictions	play	a	major	role	in	generating perceptual	experience,	then	what,	if	anything,	is	the	difference	between	merely accurately	guessing	that	there	is	a	banana	behind	a	curtain	and	perceiving	the banana	itself?	Regarding	the	model	that	finds	the	basic	structure	of	perception	in acquaintance	with	a	banana	and	its	properties,	or	in	an	heir	to	Russell's	notion	of acquaintance,	how	does	it	integrate	with	theories	of	perceptual	processing? In	my	replies,	I	argue	that	my	inferentialist	version	of	the	Rationality	of	Perception is	better	equipped	than	Clark	and	Peacocke's	models	each	are	to	account	for	both perceptual	hijacking	and	perceptual	knowledge.	Clark	and	Peacocke	offer	nuanced answers	to	the	central	questions	facing	each	of	their	models,	and	in	my	replies	I criticize	some	of	these	answers.	I	argue	that	Clark's	model,	when	joined	with	his epistemological	assumptions,	cannot	analyze	the	local	as	opposed	to	systemic epistemic	compromises	imposed	by	perceptual	hijacking,	and	that	Peacocke's Factive	Theory	does	not	offer	an	adequate	account	of	the	epistemic	shortcomings distinctive	of	perceptual	hijacking. I	begin	by	replying	to	Clark. *	For	helpful	discussion,	thanks	to	Ned	Block,	Alex	Byrne,	David	Chalmers,	Andy Clark,	Zoe	Jenkin,	Eric	Mandelbaum,	Christopher	Peacocke,	Michael	Rescorla,	Nico Silins,	Scott	Sturgeon,	and	especially	Jonna	Vance. Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 5 Reply	to	Clark Clark	endorses	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	and	this	is	our	first	major	point of	agreement.	A	second	major	point	of	agreement	is	that	perceptual	experiences	can be	shaped	by	prior	predictions	about	the	way	the	world	is.	In	fearing	that	Jack	is angry,	Jill	is	expecting	him	to	be	angry,	and	this	expectation	can	shape	her perceptual	experience.	In	experiencing	a	grey	banana	as	yellowish,	one	is	predicting what	color	bananas	will	be.	We	both	regard	these	examples	as	psychologically realistic. Our	disagreements	concern	the	factors	that	determine	the	epistemic	status	of perceptual	experiences.	Clark	thinks	the	epistemic	status	of	perceptual	experiences depends	on	long-term	processes	that	manifest	the	extent	to	which	a	subject	is	closed off	from	new	information	or	open	to	it.	These	processes	include	actions	both "world-altering	action"	and	gatherings	of	information	(in	his	terms,	"harvesting evidence").	Such	processes	are	therefore	not	just	computations	over	information. Clark	classifies	them	as	inferences,	but	since	standard	inferences	do	not	involve either	kind	of	action,	I'll	call	Clark's	processes	action-involving	inferences.	My inferentialist	version	of	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	is	based	on	standard inference,	whereas	Clark's	version	is	based	on	action-involving	inference. Clark's	rejection	of	the	standard-inference	inferentialist	version	of	the	Rationality	of Perception	thesis	underlies	his	account	of	the	grounds	of	perceptual	hijacking, which	he	thinks	is	highly	limited	in	scope.	Here	Clark	makes	three	related	critical points. First,	Clark's	approach	makes	ongoing	psychosis	the	paradigm	of	perceptual hijacking.	On	the	predictive	Bayesian	analysis	of	psychosis	that	Clark	favors, psychotic	thoughts	and	perceptions	result	from	temporally	extended	actioninvolving	inferences	that	close	off	the	subject's	information	channels.	Since	nothing in	my	example	of	Jill	involves	any	such	systemic	cutting	off	of	incoming	information, Clark	thinks	it	can't	be	a	case	of	perceptual	hijacking. Second,	Clark	argues	that	since	Jill's	intake	of	information	isn't	systematically blocked	by	the	influence	of	her	prior	beliefs	on	her	experience,	that	influence	must be	epistemically	on	a	par	with	the	influence	of	prior	beliefs	in	the	speed	or	Dino illusions.	He	reasons	that	if	I	classify	Jill's	experience	as	perceptually	hijacked,	I'd have	to	classify	the	speed	and	Dino	illusions	as	perceptually	hijacked	as	well,	and	at that	point	the	scope	of	perceptual	hijacking	would	extend	too	far. Third,	Clark	holds	that	in	any	of	these	cases	that	supposedly	stand	or	fall	together,	if a	prior	belief	that	p	produces	an	experience	that	q	via	Bayesian	processing	of	the sort	he	favors,	it	is	epistemically	okay	for	the	subject	to	update	that	prior	belief	in Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 6 (by	strengthening	it)	on	the	basis	of	that	experience.	I	think	various	instances	of	this schema	introduce	problematic	circularity. These	three	points	are	the	basis	of	Clark's	charge	that	my	version	of	the	Rationality of	Perception	thesis	fails	to	distinguish	rational	from	irrational	uses	of	information. In	response	to	Clark's	first	point,	I	will	give	reasons	to	think	that	if	we	can epistemically	appraise	perceptual	experiences	at	all,	we	can	appraise	them	along	a dimension	that's	independent	of	how	easily	the	experience	can	be	over-ridden	by other	information.	By	analogy,	when	beliefs	are	conclusions	of	standard	inferences, we	appraise	them	as	epistemically	better	or	worse	along	a	separate	parameter	from the	appraisal	of	the	subject's	disposition	to	adjust	those	beliefs	in	response	to	new information,	and	their	disposition	to	seek	out	confirming	or	disconfirming information	(section	1). In	response	to	Clark's	other	points,	I	will	identify	various	disanalogies	that	set	Jill's epistemic	situation	apart	from	the	speed	and	Dino	illusions	(section	2),	and	explain what	could	make	it	epistemically	problematic	to	update	a	prior	belief	on	the	basis	of an	experience	it	helps	produce	(section	3).	This	problematic	circularity	is independent	of	whether	the	experience	is	perceptually	hijacked. Taken	together,	my	responses	highlight	the	ways	that	my	inferentialist	Rationality of	Perception	thesis	distinguishes	rational	from	irrational	uses	of	information.	I	also argue	that	Clark's	predictive	framework	can	easily	find	broader	scope	for	perceptual hijacking	and	problematic	circularity.	His	framework	does	not	force	him	into limiting	its	scope	in	the	ways	he	does,	and	in	the	ways	that	underlie	his	criticisms	of my	inferentialist	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis.	His	criticisms	come	instead	from an	optional	epistemological	commitment	that	is	independent	of	his	theoretical framework.	I	begin	by	examining	this	epistemological	commitment. 1.	Cognitive	engines	and	action-involving	inference In	characterizing	the	perceptual	experiences	that	Clark	thinks	best	illustrate perceptual	hijacking,	he	writes:	"I	can't	see	any	way	to	judge	the	individuals	[as rational	or	irrational]	apart	from	as	culturally	situated	cognitive	engines	exhibiting (or	failing	to	exhibit)	certain	checks	and	balances	in	the	use	of	sensory	evidence	and priors". The	perceptual	experiences	had	in	psychosis	are	hijacked	and	redound poorly	on	the	subject,	Clark	says,	because	those	experiences	are	generated	by cognitive	engines	that	fail	to	exhibit	proper	checks	and	balances.	This	failure	is made	manifest	only	over	temporally	extended	processes. An	epistemically	good	long-term	process	is	illustrated	by	the	first	case	of	Dino,	in which	the	prior	favoring	Dino	produces	an	illusion	of	Dino	(caused	by	the	sabretoothed	cat),	but	the	illusion	will	get	corrected	once	you	hear	the	cat	roar	or	meow. "What	matters	here,	as	in	science	itself,"	Clark	writes,	"is	the	longer-term	openness of	the	system	(via	action)	to	harvesting	and	recognizing	disconfirming	evidence." Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 7 Clark	thus	ties	the	rational	appraisability	of	hijacked	experiences	directly	to	the status	of	the	cognitive	engines	that	produce	them.	Superficially,	this	position	is similar	in	its	structure	to	a	central	strand	of	reasoning	in	The	Rationality	of Perception,	according	to	which	a	state	that	is	the	conclusion	of	a	standard	inference inherits	the	epistemic	status	of	the	inference's	inputs.	But	in	my	inferential	version of	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis,	inferences	are	local	and	it	is	short-term transitions	that	determine	epistemic	status	of	the	output	–	not	the	status	of	the cognitive	engines	overall.	By	contrast,	on	Clark's	picture,	it's	the	ongoing	processes of	cognitive	engines	that	conduct	their	epistemic	status.	So	he	ends	up	assimilating the	epistemic	status	of	the	states	produced	by	the	engines	to	the	epistemic	status	of the	engines	that	produce	them. Clark's	defense	of	this	account	of	the	epistemic	status	of	perceptual	experience	rests on	a	general	claim	about	what	it	takes	for	a	state's	rational	status	to	redound	on	the individual. He	"can't	see	any	way	to	judge	the	individuals	[as	rational	or	irrational] apart	from	as	...	cognitive	engines	exhibiting	(or	failing	to	exhibit)	certain	checks and	balances	in	the	use	of	sensory	evidence	and	priors",	which	implies	that	any	type of	state	or	local	process	that	redounds	on	the	subject's	rational	standing	will	inherit its	epistemic	status	from	the	status	of	the	cognitive	engine	that	produces	it.1 For example,	beliefs	manifest	a	degreed	status	as	rational	or	irrational,	and	this	status contributes	to	how	rational	or	irrational	the	believer	is.	A	parallel	point	applies	to standard	inferences.	And	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	is	that	the	same	point applies	to	perceptual	experiences	as	well.	On	Clark's	picture,	when	a	belief,	standard inference,	or	perceptual	experience	has	an	epistemic	status,	this	status	derives	from how	much	or	little	the	system	as	a	whole	exhibits	the	proper	checks	and	balances	in the	use	of	priors	and	sensory	evidence. This	picture	is	too	coarsely	grained	to	provide	the	analytic	resources	we	need	for	a theory	of	epistemic	evaluation.	Consider	the	case	of	belief.	If	I	conclude	that everyone	left	the	party	at	midnight	because	they	were	afraid	of	getting	sunburn from	the	party	snacks,	my	inference	could	be	bad,	even	if	I	give	up	on	this	theory after	further	discussing	the	relationship	between	sunshine	and	crackers.	The	fact that	I'll	give	up	my	poorly	based	belief	in	the	face	of	corrective	counter-evidence helps	vindicate	my	practices	of	belief	adjustment,	and	it	is	also	a	point	in	favor	of	the belief	itself,	as	it	shows	that	the	belief	is	properly	non-resilient.	But	these	goodmaking	features	of	me	and	my	belief	don't	stop	the	belief	from	being	epistemically bad	as	it	stands,	along	a	different	dimension.	In	general,	adjusting	beliefs	in response	to	new	information	is	a	different	parameter	of	evaluation	from	being evidentially	well	supported	in	the	first	place.2	Similarly,	if	perceptual	experiences can	be	rational	or	irrational	at	all,	they	can	be	appraised	by	how	they	are	locally formed	and	maintained,	and	how	well	they	are	formed	and	maintained	can	come 1	Chirimuuta	(2018)	reacts	in	a	similar	way	to	some	of	the	examples	in	The Rationality	of	Perception. 2	For	more	on	the	distinction	between	resilience	and	evidential	support	in	a Bayesian	framework,	see	Joyce	(2005) Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 8 apart	from	how	well	the	system	does	as	a	whole	at	blocking	or	allowing	new information	to	get	to	the	subject.	A	perceptual	system	like	Jill's	could	be	properly sensitive	to	new	information	in	general,	but	still	produce	a	perceptual	experience via	a	faulty	standard	inference.	Since	standard	inferences	redound	on	a	subject,	they are	a	way	to	"judge	individuals	as	rational	or	irrational"	apart	from	how	well	their cognitive	engines	do	as	a	system. Clark	does	not	discuss	explicitly	whether	he	thinks	standard	inferences	are	units	of epistemic	appraisal.	If	he	thinks	they	are,	then	some	principled	reason	is	needed	to think	that	perceptual	experiences	cannot	be	the	conclusions	of	standard	inferences. Several	chapters	of	The	Rationality	of	Perception	are	devoted	to	arguing	that	there are	no	such	principled	reasons,	so	that	is	where	the	issue	would	need	to	be	joined. And	if	Clark	thinks	standard	inferences	are	never	units	of	epistemic	appraisal,	either as	routes	to	experiences	or	to	beliefs,	then	he	would	be	rejecting	much	more	than the	standard-inferentialist	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis.	He	would	be	rejecting any	epistemic	position	that	allows	beliefs	to	be	formed	well	or	badly	by	standard inference. 2.	How	Jill's	experience	could	be	hijacked	even	if	other	illusions	aren't Jill	is	a	character	in	a	thought-experiment	who	appears	early	on	in	the	book	(as Clark	notes),	before	any	discussion	of	the	kinds	of	psychological	processing	that could	underlie	her	situation.	My	initial	rendition	of	her	situation	abstracts	from these	details,	which	could	be	filled	in	various	different	ways.	Of	course	it's	the details	of	psychological	processing	that	will	determine	how	much	weight	is	given	to prior	outlooks	and	sensory	input,	and	therefore	whether	the	experience	is perceptually	hijacked,	and	going	with	that,	how	rational	or	irrational	the	experience is.	Given	my	strategy	for	defending	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis,	what's	most illuminating	for	my	defense	are	versions	of	the	case	in	which	the	experience	is produced	via	an	irrational	process.	If	there	are	some	epistemically	innocuous	routes by	which	Jill	could	arrive	from	her	fear	to	experience,	that	is	neither	here	nor	there. What	matters	is	whether	there	can	be	irrational	routes	to	this	experience. Clark's	rendition	of	the	case	belongs	to	a	theory	that	purports	to	specify	the computational	principles	that	operate	in	the	mind.	His	ground	for	classifying	Jill's experience	as	rational	come	from	his	epistemological	commitment	(criticized	in	the previous	section)	that	when	the	cognitive	engines	work	well,	and	the	prior assumptions	are	reasonable,	the	local	transitions	from	inferential	inputs	to perceptual	experiences	are	rational	as	well.	By	contrast,	I	think	we	need	and	have	a more	fine-grained	analysis	that	can	identify	potential	flaws	in	Jill's	case	that	are missing	from	the	other	cases.	If	we	look	more	closely	at	the	moving	parts	of	Clark's predictive	theory	or	any	other	Bayesian	theory	of	perception,	we	can	see	how	even by	the	lights	of	those	theories,	Jill's	experience	could	be	hijacked	even	if	the	other illusions	Clark	discusses	are	epistemically	fine. 2.1	Noisiness	and	likelihoods Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 9 An	important	difference	between	Jill's	case	and	the	speed	and	Dino	illusions	is	that the	speed	and	Dino	illusions	take	place	in	the	fog,	where	local	measurements	of speed	and	spatial	features	are	less	exact.	Under	such	noisy	conditions,	which	Clark calls	"un-ecological",	it	may	be	epistemically	proper	for	priors	to	carry	more	weight in	determining	the	content	of	experience	than	they	would	if	conditions	were	less noisy.	(I'll	grant	this	for	the	sake	of	argument,	though	one	could	ask	why	it	wouldn't be	more	rational	to	suspend	judgment	in	some	cases). By	contrast,	in	Jill's	case,	there	need	be	nothing	noisy	or	un-ecological	about	the circumstance	under	which	she	takes	in	sensory	signals.	There	is	no	noise	factor analogous	to	the	one	introduced	by	fog	that	justifies	weighting	the	prior	more heavily	in	the	speed-illusion. In	Clark's	framework,	taking	account	of	noise	in	the	sensory	signal	amounts	to lowering	the	precision	weighting	of	the	signal.	Lowering	the	precision	is	a	way	of favoring	the	prior.	At	an	extreme,	Jill	could	completely	dismiss	the	sensory	signal	as noise,	giving	it	a	minimal	precision	weighting.	That	would	approach	what	Clark	calls "reverberation",	following	Jardi	and	Deneve	(2013),	in	which	a	prior	is	mistaken	for sensory	evidence.	Reverberation	would	be	a	limit	case	of	Jill's	example,	because	in reverberation	there	is	no	experience,	and	therefore	no	influence	on	it	by	anything else.	Clark	follows	Jardi	and	Deneve	in	thinking	that	reverberation	occurs	in psychosis,	but	he	does	not	explain	why	thinks	it	couldn't	also	happen	locally.	Going with	that,	no	explanation	is	offered	of	why	Jill	couldn't	stop	just	short	of reverberation	by	dismissing	the	sensory	signal	as	pure	noise. Reverberation	would	be	no	more	justified	than	just	strengthening	the	prior arbitrarily,	in	response	to	nothing. And	when	precision-weightings	are	inputs	to rational	inference,	an	inferentialist	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	will	imply	that precision-weightings	are	epistemically	appraisable.	Even	if	it	is	reasonable	for	the subjects	of	the	speed	and	Dino	illusions	to	lower	the	precision	on	the	signal	when it's	foggy,	there	is	no	analogous	reason	for	Jill	to	lower	the	precision	on	the	sensory signal	from	Jack. If	she	does	so	anyway,	then	she's	doing	so	without	justification. Even	in	a	framework	without	precision	weightings,	there	would	still	be	other epistemically	appraisable	inferential	inputs	besides	Jill's	suspicion	that	Jack	is	angry, including	the	likelihood	(a	conditional	probability)	of	receiving	a	specified	sensory input,	if	Jack	is	angry.	Here	is	another	way	for	Jill	to	favor	the	prior	that	Jack	is angry:	raise	the	value	of	the	likelihood.	Like	a	precision	weighting,	a	likelihood	will be	epistemically	apprasiable,	and	on	the	face	of	it,	someone	could	assign	a	higher value	to	the	likelihood	than	they	have	grounds	for	assigning. High	likelihoods	and	low	precision-weightings	are	two	ways	for	Jill	to	give	the sensory	input	insufficient	weight,	even	if	her	suspicion	that	Jack	is	angry	is	perfectly rational.	On	either	scenario,	the	inference	would	be	epistemically	flawed,	even	by the	lights	of	a	Bayesian	theory	of	perception. Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 10 2.2	Bad	reasoning	from	good	premises	vs.	Good	reasoning	from	bad	premises If	we	consider	precision	weightings	and	likelihoods	to	be	just	as	much	part	of	Jill's prior	outlook	as	her	suspicion	that	Jack	is	angry,	then	the	epistemic	flaws	just described	would	be	inferences	from	an	epistemically	poor	prior	outlook,	rather	than inferences	from	an	epistemically	reasonable	one.	Clark's	speed	and	Dino	cases	are meant	to	be	involve	reasonable	priors,	and	if	priors	include	likelihoods	and precision	weightings,	then	Jill	could	differ	from	the	other	cases	by	having unreasonable	likelihoods	or	precision	weightings. But	we	can	also	consider	a	version	of	Jill's	case	where	her	priors,	precision weightings,	and	likelihoods	are	all	reasonable,	yet	even	so,	the	transition	she	makes from	those	inputs	to	her	experience	is	bad.	Clark	doesn't	make	explicit	whether	his predictive	framework	allows	this	kind	of	error.	But	arguably,	it	should.	Even	if	all	of the	components	of	the	Bayesian	inference	have	the	values	they	should	have,	that still	does	not	ensure	that	inference	proceeds	properly. This	kind	of	mistake	is possible	in	principle.	On	the	face	of	it,	it	would	also	seem	to	be	psychologically possible. Cases	in	which	people	reason	poorly	about	uncertainties	are	the	thin	edge	of	the wedge	when	it	comes	to	psychological	mechanisms	that	could	underlie	perceptual hijacking.	If	Clark's	framework	cannot	analyze	these	cases,	then	they	form	a	chunk of	mental	phenomena	that	falls	outside	the	scope	of	his	theory.	The	same	possibility should	be	allowed	in	non-predictive	Bayesian	framework.	What	would	be	needed	to defend	Clark's	highly	limited	scope	for	perceptual	hijacking	are	principled	reasons to	think	that	the	routes	to	perceptual	experience	are	special	in	precluding	mistakes in	inference	of	the	sort	we	find	elsewhere	in	the	mind. Perhaps	Clark's	focus	on	theorizing	about	normal	operations	of	the	mind	sets	aside the	theory	of	cognitive	errors	as	a	topic	for	a	different	project.	But	what's	at	issue here	is	whether	it's	possible	for	these	mistakes	to	be	made.	The	epistemological thesis	criticized	in	section	1	entails	that	local,	ungrounded	precision-lowerings	and local	reverberation	embedded	in	unbroken	cognitive	engines	are	either	not mistakes,	or	else	that	such	local	flaws	can't	occur	in	our	minds.	I've	suggested	that they	are	epistemic	mistakes,	and	that	it	would	be	remarkable	if	we	were	immune from	making	them. 3.	Clarkian	circularity	and	double-updating Clark	focuses	on	my	question	"if	your	prior	beliefs	could	influence	your	experience, how	could	your	experience	go	on	to	strengthen	those	very	beliefs?".	His	answer	to this	question	is	"Normally,	you	can",	and	he	helpfully	highlights	the	aspects	of	his predictive	theory	that	are	supposed	to	show	why	doing	so	is	epistemically	okay. My	point	in	asking	the	question	in	the	second	paragraph	of	the	book	is	to	help readers	wonder	and	care	about	what	epistemic	impact	prior	outlooks	might	have	on perception.	The	discussion	of	much	more	specific	epistemic	flaws	comes	later. Clark uses	this	question	to	focus	on	both	perceptual	hijacking	and	circularity,	and	he Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 11 treats	these	topics	together	when	he	first	describes	Jill	and	the	preformationists' processing	as	"looking	suspiciously	like	double-counting",	and	then	says	"this	is	the problem	of	perceptual	hijacking."	It	may	seem	natural	to	treat	circularity	and hijacking	together	because	the	case	of	Jill,	in	its	initial,	purposefully	underspecified form,	can	be	used	to	illustrate	both	of	them.	Clark's	commentary	helps	brings	out the	distinction	between	the	problem	of	hijacked	experience,	which	concerns	a	route to	experience,	and	the	question	of	what	combinations	of	routes	and	responses	to experience	would	result	in	epistemically	problematic	circularity. Let's	say	a	processing	route	exhibits	Clarkian	circularity	if	a	prior	belief	that	p produces	an	experience	that	q	via	Bayesian	processing	of	the	sort	Clark	favors,	and the	subject	updates	that	prior	belief	(by	strengthening	it)	on	the	basis	of	that experience. This	schematic	description	of	the	situation	helps	us	describe	a difference	that	Clark	doesn't	mention	between	Jill's	case	and	other	cases.	In	Jill's case,	p	=	q,	whereas	in	other	cases,	p	is	a	generalization	(such	as	'Low	speeds	are more	common')	whereas	q	is	about	a	particular	situation	(for	example	'I	am	going slowly'). Putting	aside	cases	when	it	is	generated	by	a	cognitive	engine	that	tends	to	shut down	channels	of	information	from	the	world,	Clark	thinks	that	Clarkian	circularity is	epistemically	fine.	He	considers	it	"a	standard	and	crucial	route	to	belief	revision": "When	the	animal	starts	to	roar	or	meow	I	re-parse	the	foggy	scene,	seeing the	sabre-toothed	cat.	The	route	to	this	rationally	revised	percept	still strongly	implicates	my	priors	–	that	pesky	cat	was,	after	all,	the	nextprobable	cause.	But	I	am	surely	right	to	take	the	success	of	the	cat	hypothesis at	accommodating	these	new	waves	of	sensory	evidence	as	itself	increasing the	subjective	probability	that	the	object	is	my	cat.	To	think	otherwise	would deprive	me	of	a	standard	and	crucial	route	to	belief	revision". Here	the	potential	difference	between	the	p	and	q	in	the	schema	becomes	useful. In	the	Dino	and	the	speed	illusions,	we	can	distinguish	a	generalization	(slow	speeds are	more	common,	bananas	are	yellow,	the	cat	tends	to	frequent	my	yard,	or <timelessly>:	the	cat	is	in	my	yard)	from	the	content	of	a	percept	that	the	prior	helps produce	("this	thing	before	me	is	a	yellow	banana",	"the	cat	is	in	my	yard	now",	"I am	moving	slowly").	What's	standard	and	arguably	crucial	is	to	take	these experiences	at	face	value	and	undeniably	so,	when	the	experiences	provide knowledge.3 Taking	your	experience	at	face	value	is	believing	your	eyes.	But believing	your	eyes	does	not	amount	to	updating	the	prior,	when	p≠q	in	the	schema. When	p≠q,	even	if	it	is	epistemically	okay	to	believe	your	eyes,	there	is	still	a	further question:	is	it	also	epistemically	okay	to	update	the	generalization	that	informed	the 3	As	he	emphasizes	in	his	commentary,	Peacocke	thinks	it	violates	a	central	norm	of belief	to	take	an	experience	at	face	value	if	it	is	an	illusion,	even	if	you're	unaware	of that	fact	and	there	is	no	perceptual	hijacking. Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 12 experience?	To	answer	this	question	properly,	the	structure	of	the	underlying processing	needs	to	be	specified. In	any	kind	of	Bayesian	model	of	the	mind,	whether	Clark's	global	predictive	version or	a	theory	aimed	only	as	specific	local	processes	(such	as	speed	perception),	a	key distinction	is	between	merely	calculating	new	probabilistic	values	for	hypotheses	in response	to	new	evidence,	and	encoding	and	storing	those	values	to	use	in subsequent	calculations.	Simplifying	greatly,	according	to	the	Bayesian	theory	of content-determination,	an	experience	is	produced	by	selecting	a	hypothesis	from among	all	the	posterior	probabilities	that	are	calculated	in	response	to	sensory evidence.	In	the	speed	example,	the	hypothesis	that's	selected	is	that	you're	going slowly.4 There	are	potentially	two	kinds	of	calculations	that	can	be	made	in	response	to	new evidence.	In	discussing	them,	I'll	assume	for	simplicity	(using	the	schema	for Clarkian	circularity)	that	p=q,	so	that	in	the	simplified	version	of	the	speed	case,	I assign	probabilities	to	the	prior	hypothesis	expressed	by	"I	am	going	slow",	and	this same	hypothesis	is	the	content	of	my	experience.5	I'll	abbreviate	this	content	"Slow". To	illustrate,	suppose	the	evidence	is	initial	sensory	input.	First,	using	Bayes,	upon starting	to	move,	I	can	calculate	a	new	value	of	the	conditional	probability	Pnew	from sensory	input	(slow|sensory	input),	where	the	evidence	is	not	yet	the	experience,	but rather	the	initial	sensory	input.	And	then,	from	that	conditional	probability,	I	can calculate	the	unconditional	prior	Pnew	from	sensory	input	(slow)	using	some	kind	of conditionalization. So	far,	I've	described	a	traditional	Bayesian	way	of	calculating	new	values	for probabilities.6	If	we	were	simply	doing	a	math	problem,	calculating	these	two posterior	probabilities	using	Bayes	and	conditionalization	would	be	sufficient	to prepare	us	for	subsequent	calculations	in	light	of	the	perceptual	experience	that these	calculations	help	produce. But	when	the	formal	system	is	used	to	model	psychological	processing,	it	gains	a new	dimension	of	complexity.	Once	I	calculate	the	posterior	values	for	Pnew	from	sensory input	(slow|sensory	input)	and	Pnew	from	sensory	input	(slow),	it's	a	further	question whether	I	store	and	use	the	latter	value	in	subsequent	applications	of	Bayes. 4	This	point	has	been	emphasized	by	Jonna	Vance	and	David	Bennett	in conversation. 5	This	assumption	is	probably	an	idealization	but	it	won't	get	in	the	way	of	clarifying the	factors	that	determine	when	Clarkian	circularity	is	epistemically	problematic. 6	I	am	setting	aside	the	major	issue	of	what	kind	of	approximation	of	Bayesian inference	takes	place	in	Clark's	framework.	So	long	as	there	are	analogous	of	priors and	posterior	probabilities,	the	points	to	follow	will	apply. Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 13 In	order	to	determine	the	content	of	an	experience,	all	that's	needed	is	calculating	a new	value,	given	a	pre-experiential	sensory	input.	There	are	two	things	I	don't necessarily	have	to	do.	First,	I	don't	necessarily	have	to	swap	in	Pnew	from	sensory	input (slow)	for	Pold	(slow).	At	an	extreme,	I	never	have	to	change	Pold	(slow)	at	all.	(That would	be	one	way	for	the	prior	to	be	immalleable	in	response	to	both	the	sensory input	to	an	experience,	and	the	experience	itself). Second,	I	don't	necessarily	have to	conditionalize	to	calculate	the	value	of	P(slow),	in	order	to	select	the	hypothesis to	be	the	content	of	experience.	(Or	my	cognitive	engine	doesn't	have	to	which	for Clark	comes	to	same	thing).	The	selection	rule	could	just	pick	whatever	hypothesis figures	in	the	highest	conditional	probability	generated	by	Bayes	–	for	example, P(slow)	as	opposed	to	P(fast). These	options	are	important	because	my	perceptual	experience	gives	me	another round	of	evidence	that	bears	on	my	speed.	So	I	can	use	Bayes	once	again	to	calculate another	posterior	conditional	Pnew	from	experience	(slow|experience),	and	have	the option	of	conditionalizing	to	get	a	new	unconditional	prior	Pnew	from	experience	(slow). To	determine	whether	there's	any	double-counting,	the	crucial	question	is	this: When	I	make	the	calculation	that	takes	my	experience	as	input,	which	P(slow)	do	I use:	Pold(slow),	or	Pnew	from	sensory	input	(slow)?	Pold(slow)	is	the	value	that	was	my	prior when	I	got	the	sensory	input.	Pnew	from	sensory	input	(slow)	is	the	posterior	value	I	got	by conditionalizing	on	the	result	of	my	Bayesian	calculation	that	used	Pold	(slow). I	need	not	use	Pnew	from	sensory	input	(slow),	even	though	I	had	to	calculate	it. If	the	prior I	use	in	drawing	on	my	experience	to	update	my	opinion	about	how	often	I	move slowly	is	Pold(slow),	then	there	is	not	even	an	appearance	of	double-counting.	I	use my	prior	from	before	I	have	the	experience,	and	then	replace	it	with	a	posterior value	in	response	to	my	experience. But	things	look	different	if	I	use	Pnew	from	sensory	input	(slow). If	I've	already	replaced Pold(slow)	with	Pnew	from	sensory	input	(slow),	then	if	I	go	on	to	update	Pnew	from	sensory	input (slow)	in	response	to	my	experience,	I	am	counting	my	sensory	inputs	twice.	First	I interpret	the	sensory	input	from	my	situation	in	the	Bayesian	calculation	of	the posterior	probability.	That's	already	updating	my	speed	statistics.	If	I	then	update my	prior	again	in	response	to	my	experience,	I	am	updating	the	statistics	using information	from	the	same	instance	all	over	again.	So	I	have	counted	the	same sensory	input	twice,	once	on	its	own,	and	again	in	the	guise	of	the	perceptual experience. Vance	(2015)	describes	this	kind	of	situation	as	"double-counting",	and	explains why	Bayesian	forms	of	perceptual	processing	are	not	doomed	to	double-count	in this	way.	His	term	is	apt	for	describing	the	processes	we	both	consider	epistemically problematic.	Clark	uses	the	label	"double-counting"	more	broadly	when	he	equates double-counting	with	perceptual	hijacking.	Double-counting	in	Vance's	sense involves	taking	experience	as	an	input,	whereas	perceptual	hijacking	is	feature	of routes	that	produce	experience	as	an	output. Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 14 Clark's	predictive	framework	is	not	fated	to	double-count	in	Vance's	sense.	As	I've emphasized,	it	is	possible	to	use	Pold(slow)	to	calculate	Pnew	from	experience (slow|experience),	which	in	turn	can	generate	Pnew	from	experience	(slow).	And	there	are at	least	two	other	ways	processing	could	unfold,	to	avoid	double-counting. First,	it	is	possible	that	only	the	likelihoods	are	updated	in	response	to	the experience,	while	the	prior	conditional	probability	of	the	hypothesis	given	the	input is	not	updated	at	all.	(Vance	(2015)	cites	evidence	for	this	option	in	the	case	in	some sensory-motor	tasks).	And	perhaps	in	some	cases,	neither	prior	nor	likelihood	are updated,	because	they	are	both	immalleable	or	highly	resilient	default	assumptions of	the	system.	Here	we	find	a	potential	difference	between	the	slow-speed	prior	and Clark's	Dino	case.	When	he	says	that	after	we	have	our	(illusory)	Dino-experience	in case	2,	"systemic	faith	in	Dino	increases",	Clark	suggests	that	our	cognitive	engine updates	its	statistics	on	where	Dino	tends	to	be.	Those	statistics are	presumably updated	in	response	to	sensory	inputs	or	experiences,	but	hopefully	not	both.	By contrast,	the	slow-speed	prior	may	be	much	less	malleable,	and	perhaps	it	does	not get	updated	at	all.7	So	here	is	a	potential	difference	between	the	speed	and	Dino illusions. Second,	a	prior	assumption	P(slow|sensory	input)	could	in	principle	be	encoded	in two	ways	in	the	mind:	once	in	the	visual	system,	for	example,	and	then	again	at	the level	of	the	belief	that	interacts	more	widely	with	the	rest	of	the	cognitive	system.8	If the	visually	encoded	prior	is	updated	in	response	to	sensory	input	but	not experience,	whereas	the	belief	is	updated	in	response	to	the	experience	but	not	the sensory	input,	then	double-counting	is	avoided.	Since	Clark	elsewhere	characterizes the	boundary	between	belief	and	perception	is	"fuzzified"	by	his	predictive framework,	he	could	not	invoke	this	way	of	avoiding	double-counting,	unless	he	has some	other	way	to	distinguish	between	the	two	ways	that	the	generalization	is encoded	in	the	mind. So	nothing	in	the	framework	forces	double-counting	to	occur,	and	nothing	in	Jill's case,	abstractly	described,	forces	that	either.	For	all	that,	though,	double-counting	is possible	in	Clark's	framework,	it	is	epistemically	problematic,	and	could	happen whenever	some	kind	of	updating	has	to	occur,	as	in	cases	like	Dino. To	add	to	the	epistemic	difficulties,	I	might	not	be	in	a	position	to	recognize	or prevent	double-counting	when	it	occurs.	But	it	is	an	epistemic	flaw	all	the	same. What	makes	Jill's	case	useful	for	fixing	ideas	is	that	it	calls	attention	to	these possibilities	of	epistemic	compromise,	and	then	by	considering	the	underlying structure	of	inferences	to	and	from	perceptual	experience,	we	can	pin	down	which of	those	structures	would	be	problematic	and	why. 7	Though	Sotiropolous	et	al	(2011)	suggest	that	it	is	malleable. 8	This	option	is	also	discussed	by	Vance	(2015). Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 15 I've	focused	on	the	bare	outlines	of	Bayesian	frameworks	including	Clark's	to illustrate	what	double-counting	would	be	and	why	it	is	bad.	Outside	Clark's framework,	the	bare	structure	of	Clarkian	circularity	could	easily	be	epistemically problematic.	For	instance,	if	Jill's	inference	to	her	experience	is	not	a	Bayesian inference,	but	is	simply	an	inference	from	the	suspicion	to	the	experience,	it	is	hard to	see	how	the	experience	could	be	epistemically	poised	to	strengthen	the	suspicion. Jill's	transition	could	take	exactly	this	form.	Since	this	set	of	transitions	would	not	be Bayesian	at	all,	let	alone	Bayesian	business	as	usual,	perhaps	Clark	would	agree	that this	form	of	circularity	is	problematic.	By	describing	the	case	in	general	terms	at	the start	of	the	book,	I	leave	room	for	an	initial	reaction	that	something	may	be	fishy	in this	case,	the	rest	of	the	book	is	designed	to	give	us	tools	for	analyzing	what	the	badmaking	features	could	be.	Those	same	tools	also	show	us	how	the	case	could	be epistemically	okay,	depending	on	its	psychological	underpinnings. Conclusion Our	broad	agreement	on	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	cuts	across	different theoretical	projects.	My	theory	aims	to	uncover	the	epistemic	properties	of inferences	that	produce	epistemically	evaluable	experiences.	Part	of	the	theory	is	a theory	of	inference,	and	that	part	is	descriptive.	But	both	the	normative	and	the descriptive	parts	of	my	theory	are	cast	at	a	higher	level	of	generality	and	abstraction Clark's	theory,	which	purports	to	specify	which	computational	principles	operate	in the	mind. By	contrast,	Clark's	analysis	of	how	perceptual	experiences	are	epistemically appraisable	belongs	to	a	theory	of	the	brain	as	fundamentally	a	'prediction machine'.9	For	Clark,	predictions	shape	all	of	perception,	as	well	as	cognition	and action	and	everything	else	the	brain	does.	So	while	we	agree	that	predictions	can shape	perceptual	experiences,	Clark's	version	of	this	claim	is	much	more	general than	my	version,	it	works	with	a	different	notion	of	inference,	and	it	is	much	more committal	about	the	kinds	of	computations	involved	in	the	inference. Despite	the	difference	in	levels	of	abstraction	and	generality,	both	of	our	theories make	commitments	about	the	scope	for	epistemic	shortcomings	among	the psychologically	possible	routes	to	perceptual	experience.	And	that's	where	we	have our	main	disagreements.	I've	argued	that	there	are	routes	to	and	from	perceptual experiences	that	are	epistemically	flawed,	but	that	Clark	either	classifies	the	routes as	epistemically	okay,	or	rules	them	out	as	psychologically	impossible. 9	Clark	(2016),	Chapter	1.	E.g.,	"...brains	are	not	fundamentally	in	the	business	of 'processing	inputs'	at	all.	Rather,	they	are	fundamentally	in	the	business	of predicting	their	inputs".	(p.	52) Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 16 Reply	to	Peacocke Peacocke	and	I	agree	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	perceptual	hijacking,	that	it	saps experiences	of	epistemic	power,	thereby	leaving	them	epistemically	downgraded, and	that	there	is	something	unreasonable	about	taking	a	hijacked	experience	at	face value,	even	if	the	subject	is	unaware	of	the	downgrade.	We	disagree	about	how	best to	explain	why	perceptual	hijacking	has	this	epistemic	impact	on	experiences.	My explanation	is	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis,	and	I	focus	on	an	inferentialist version	the	thesis	according	to	which	experiences	can	be	rational	or	irrational depending	on	the	quality	of	inferences	that	produce	them.	Peacocke	thinks	the epistemic	effects	of	perceptual	hijacking	are	better	explained	by	the	Factive	Theory norm. In	addition	to	defending	the	Factive	Theory	norm	as	an	alternative	to	my	analysis, Peacocke	criticizes	two	central	claims	on	which	my	defense	of	the	inferentialist version	of	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	rests:	that	nothing	in	the	nature	of experience	rules	it	out	as	a	conclusion	of	inference,	and	that	nothing	in	the	nature	of inference	precludes	it	from	having	experiences	as	a	conclusion.	In	arguing	against these	claims,	Peacocke's	main	conceit	is	that	perception	is	initiated	by	the	world, whereas	inference	is	initiated	by	the	mind	(p.	6),	and	this	pair	of	features	counts against	both	of	my	central	claims.	His	Factive	Theory	develops	the	idea	that perception	is	initiated	by	the	world,	and	it	helps	support	his	version	of	the traditional	fundamental	divide	that	positions	perception	outside	the	house	of reason.	Perception	falls	outside	the	house	of	reason	because	it	is	passive,	whereas belief	and	inference	belong	inside	because	they	are	or	are	defined	in	terms	of actions	specifically,	mental	actions. I	reply	in	section	4	to	Peacocke's	criticisms	of	my	case	for	the	rational	appraisability of	experience,	and	in	section	5	to	his	criticisms	of	my	case	for	inference	without reckoning.	In	section	6,	I	give	reason	to	doubt	that	the	Factive	Theory	can	account for	perceptual	hijacking,	and	in	section	7	I	argue	that	its	account	of	how	perception can	generate	knowledge	and	rational	belief	leaves	out	an	important	class	of	cases that	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	can	successfully	explain. 4.	Is	there	fundamental	rational	divide	between	perception	and	belief? When	I	argue	in	Chapter	3	that	nothing	in	the	nature	of	perceptual	experiences precludes	them	from	being	reached	by	rational	inference,	I	consider	and	reject	a range	of	attempts	to	mark	a	fundamental	divide	between	perceptual	experience	and belief,	with	respect	to	whether	they	can	be	rational	or	irrational. For	example,	all	beliefs	are	epistemically	appraisable,	even	though	many	of	them cannot	be	adjusted	by	deliberation.	The	fact	that	experiences	cannot	be	so	adjusted therefore	fails	to	show	that	they're	not	rationally	appraisable.	So	adjustability	by deliberation	does	not	mark	any	divide	between	perception	and	belief	that	would falsify	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis.	I	consider	and	reject	several	other potential	grounds	for	this	division. Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 17 In	response,	Peacocke	articulates	a	ground	for	the	division	that	he	thinks	is	not undermined	by	any	of	my	considerations. According	to	him,	there's	such	a	thing	as	a central	case	of	belief,	and	it	is	beliefs	with	content	P	formed	by	judging	that	P,	where judging	is	a	mental	action.	Such	judgments	constitute	a	primitive	exercise	of	rational capacities.	Since	perceptual	experiences	cannot	be	formed	by	judging	(on Peacocke's	construal	of	it),	a	divide	between	perception	and	belief	is	marked	by	the exercise	of	rationality	characteristic	of	judging.	Its	absence	defines	the	kind	of passivity	that	is	present	in	belief	but	missing	in	experience. The	simplest	version	of	this	picture	would	say	that	every	belief	is	formed	by judgment.	Peacocke's	version	respects	the	fact	that	not	all	beliefs	are	so	formed. What,	then,	makes	them	rational	exercises	of	the	kind	he	proposes	is	distinctive	of belief	and	impossible	for	perception? Peacocke	offers	two	considerations.	The	first	is	that	beliefs	formed	by	the	mental	act of	judging	are	the	central	case	of	belief.	They	are	central	cases	in	that	"outliers"	have "the	same	functional	and	explanatory	role"	of	such	beliefs	(p.	5). In	reply,	beliefs	share	many	functional	and	explanatory	roles	with	perception	as well,	so	a	different	account	is	needed	of	what	makes	beliefs	formed	by	judgment explanatorily	prior	to	other	beliefs. Peacocke's	second	point	is	that	for	any	belief,	its	epistemic	status	depends	on	the epistemic	status	of	a	corresponding	judgment,	even	if	she	does	not	form	the judgment	(and	as	he	suggests	in	(1998,	p.	90),	even	if	she	is	not	disposed	to	form	it). He	writes,	"the	rationality	of	a	belief	in	given	circumstances	depends	on	the	status	as rational	or	not	of	the	corresponding	judgment	of	its	content	in	those	same circumstances." But	even	if	we	hold	constant	the	conditions	under	which	a	belief	is	held,	the corresponding	judgment	need	not	have	the	same	epistemic	status,	because	it	need not	have	the	same	basis.	For	example,	I	might	believe	on	the	basis	of	nonjustification-conferring	testimony	that	sulfur	burns	yellow,	but	form	a corresponding	judgment	on	the	basis	of	remembering	seeing	sulfur	burn	yellow. Here,	I	would	manifest	an	ill-founded	belief	in	judgment,	while	making	the	judgment on	a	different	basis	which	makes	the	judgment	well-founded.	The	judgment	and belief	would	then	differ	in	epistemic	status. This	disconnect	would	be	blocked	if	the	conditions	that	we	hold	constant	when	we compare	the	belief	and	the	corresponding	judgment	include	the	basis	on	which	the belief	is	formed	and	maintained.	But	if	the	basis	is	part	of	what	we	hold	constant,	we build	in	directly	the	factors	that	determine	epistemic	status.	It	is	then	the	sameness of	basis	that	explains	why	the	belief	and	a	hypothetical	"corresponding	judgment	of its	content"	have	the	same	epistemic	status.	Nothing	in	this	comparison	suggests that	because	they	have	the	same	epistemic	status,	judgment	has	a	special	status	in explaining	what	makes	the	corresponding	belief	epistemically	appraisable. Compare:	if	two	subjects	A	and	B	each	judge	that	p	on	exactly	the	same	basis,	then Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 18 that	sameness	tells	us	nothing	about	the	explanatory	priority	of	one	subject's judgment	over	another. These	considerations	cast	doubt	on	Peacocke's	claim	that	judgments	enjoy explanatory	priority	in	making	a	mental	state	a	belief,	and	in	making	it	epistemically appraisable.	If	Peacocke's	claim	about	explanatory	priority	is	false,	then	it	is	does not	ground	a	divide	between	perception	and	belief	in	respect	of	having	a	rational status. We	can	sum	up	Peacocke's	strategy	and	my	reply	as	follows.	According	to	him,	there is	a	fundamental	division	between	perception	and	belief	with	respect	to	rationality because	beliefs	but	not	experiences	are	under	the	subject's	rational	control.	The connection	is	between	belief	and	control	is	said	to	be	secured	indirectly	by	the relationship	in	epistemic	status	between	beliefs	that	a	subject	actually	has,	and corresponding	mental	actions	of	judgment	that	they	may	never	form	and	(as Peacocke	allows	in	(1998))	may	not	even	be	disposed	to	form.	I've	argued	that	this indirect	security	relationship	does	not	hold. Depending	on	how	the	comparison between	belief	and	judgment	is	developed,	either	there	is	no	correspondence btween	belief	and	judgment	of	the	sort	Peacocke	describes,	or	else	that correspondence	has	no	leverage	in	grounding	the	distinction	between	perception and	belief. 5.	Is	inferring	always	a	mental	action? A	second	strand	in	Peacocke's	criticism	targets	my	claim	that	nothing	in	the	nature of	inference	precludes	experiences	from	being	conclusions	of	inference. In	chapter	5	I	argue	that	experiences	can	be	reached	by	rational	inferences.	This could	not	happen	if	inferring	X	from	Y	entailed	that	you	represent	that	X	supports	Y, and	then	draw	the	conclusion	because	you	take	X	to	support	Y	("reckoning"	in inference).	In	my	Kindness	example,	you	judge	that	a	clerk	you	observe	at	the	Post Office	is	kind,	and	you	judge	this	in	response	to	a	range	of	cues	(the	way	she	handles the	packages,	her	tone	of	voice,	etc).10	But	you	are	not	aware	that	you	have responded	to	these	cues,	and	so	the	reckoning	condition	isn't	met.	To	you,	it	feels	as if	you're	just	struck	with	the	thought	that	the	clerk	is	kind. Peacocke	criticizes	my	use	Kindness	example	on	the	grounds	that	the	subject	is	in struck	with	a	thought	and	this	kind	of	state	isn't	mental	action	and	so	can't	be	part	of an	inference.	He	writes,	"It	is	intuitive	that	inference	is	something	we	do	for	a certain	kind	of	reason".	The	kind	of	mental	action	Peacocke	identifies	with	inference is	a	kind	where	"the	subject	performs	the	mental	action	of	inferring	the	conclusion because	she	holds	that	the	premise	supports	the	conclusion"	(p.	4). 10	I	specify	in	footnote	16	that	kindness	is	not	among	the	properties	presented	in	the experience	in	this	example.	When	the	subject	in	the	example	judges	that	the	clerk	is kind	in	response	to	her	experience,	she	is	not	merely	taking	her	experience	at	face value. Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 19 Here	we	can	distinguish	the	thesis	that	judging	is	a	mental	action	(a	thesis	I	accept) from	the	thesis	that	the	inferring	is	a	mental	action	done	because	one	reckons	that the	premise	supports	the	conclusion	(a	thesis	I	argue	against).	If	Peacocke	is rejecting	the	Kindness	example	as	a	case	of	inference	on	the	grounds	that	the subject	is	not	performing	a	mental	action	of	the	sort	just	described,	no	leverage	is gained	on	whether	there	can	be	inference	without	reckoning. If	instead	Peacocke	is	rejecting	the	example	as	a	case	of	inference	on	the	grounds that	the	subject's	being	struck	with	a	thought	is	not	an	action,	and	the	immediate upshot	of	inferential	transitions	are	always	actions	(such	as	judging,	or	accepting within	the	scope	of	supposition),	then	two	replies	are	relevant. First,	in	the	Kindness	example,	being	struck	with	a	thought	is	a	judgment.	It	is therefore	an	action,	but	it	is	an	action	that	feels	passive,	as	all	sorts	of	actions	do. In the	throes	of	thinking	it	can	be	hard	to	stop,	just	as	it	can	be	much	harder	to	stop running,	once	one	starts,	than	it	is	to	continue.	So	felt	passivity	does	not	seem	to	rule out	being	struck	with	a	thought	as	a	way	of	making	a	judgment,	on	the	assumption that	judging	is	mental	action.	Being	struck	with	a	thought	that	p	can	be	a	case	of knowing	that	p,	as	when	you	suddenly	realize	that	your	keys	must	still	be	in	the shopping	bag,	or	that	you	have	walked	too	far	north.	Peacocke	may	be	interpreting the	example	as	if	being	struck	with	a	thought	is	merely	a	form	of	entertaining	a proposition.	While	that	is	one	way	to	be	struck	with	a	thought,	it	is	not	the	only	way. Second,	on	the	claim	that	the	immediate	output	of	inferential	transitions	is	always an	action:	one	might	hold	that	when	inference	yields	a	judgment	that	P,	there's	a single	mental	action	that	is	inferring	P	from	some	premises,	and	judging	that	P. Peacocke	treats	the	claim	that	inferences	are	mental	actions	as	part	of	an	intuitive concept	of	inference. I	think	we	can	begin	from	a	concept	of	inference	that	prescinds	from	whether inferrings	are	actions,	and	instead	takes	the	core	commitment	of	the	intuitive concept	to	be	that	inferences	redound	well	or	badly	on	the	subject's	rational standing.	The	claim	that	they	would	have	to	be	actions	to	redound	well	or	badly seems	substantive	rather	than	intuitive. Peacocke	takes	issue	with	another	of	my	putative	examples	of	inference	without reckoning,	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	merely	a	case	of	taking	an	experience	at	face value.	In	my	example,	you	bite	down	on	something	crunchy	and	try	to	figure	out whether	there's	a	rock	in	your	mouth	and	after	some	exploration	form	the	belief that	there	isn't.	Peacocke	thinks	this	is	a	case	of	taking	a	haptic-tactile	experience	at face	value,	and	that	only	an	overly	hospitable	notion	of	inference	would	count	this kind	of	transition	as	an	inference. In	reply,	while	experiences	of	absence	can	be	taken	at	face	value	to	yield	a	judgment or	belief	of	the	form	"there	is	no	X	in	region	R",	in	this	example	one	reaches	a Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 20 conclusion	that	there	is	no	rock	anywhere	in	one's	mouth	from	a	series	of experiences,	from	each	of	which	one	concludes	that	whatever	is	in	one's	mouth	is not	a	rock.	The	most	natural	description	of	this	kind	of	case	is	an	inference	of absence	of	a	rock	in	a	larger	region	from	experiences	of	smaller	regions,	where these	latter	experiences	may	present	the	absence	of	a	rock	in	the	smaller	regions	or not.	What's	important	is	that	none	of	them	have	the	content	'there	is	no	rock anywhere	in	my	mouth',	because	you	cannot	tactilely	experience	the	entirety	of	the relevant	space	all	at	once. In	sum,	part	of	Peacocke's	basic	conceit	is	that	inference	is	mental	action	and therefore	is	initiated	by	the	mind,	whereas	perception	is	initiated	by	the	world,	and this	fundamental	difference	counts	against	the	idea	that	perceptual	experience	could be	reached	by	inference.	My	examples	of	inference	without	reckoning	suggest	that inference	is	not	always	a	mental	action,	and	they	illustrate	this	without	relying	on the	idea	that	inferences	include	taking	experiences	at	face	value. 6.	Does	the	Factive	Theory	explain	why	perceptual	hijacking	downgrades experiences? Peacocke's	alternative	analysis	of	the	epistemic	impact	of	perceptual	hijacking draws	on	the	Factive	Theory	norm. Factive	Theory	norm:	Judge	that	p	on	the	basis	of	an	experience	as	of	it's being	the	case	that	p	only	if:	the	experience	is	a	genuine	perception	of	the	fact that	p. Since	genuine	perceptions	are	factive,	in	addition	to	saying	that	Jill	shouldn't	take her	experience	of	Jack's	face	as	angry	at	face	value,	this	norm	also	says	not	to	believe your	eyes	in	any	illusion	or	hallucination.	On	this	picture,	violating	the	Factive Theory	norm	downgrades	experience.	Only	experiences	in	cases	of	genuine perception	have	epistemic	power.	All	illusions	are	therefore	epistemically downgraded,	whether	the	illusion	comes	from	hijacking	or	from	factors	like	the ones	in	Peacocke's	hologram	example. Left	on	its	own,	the	Factive	Theory	norm	would	suggest	that	the	beliefs	people	form when	they	take	unwitting	illusions	at	face	value	are	unjustified,	because	these beliefs	are	based	on	epistemically	downgraded	experiences.	That	consequence	is implausible	when	applied	to	illusions	that	don't	involve	any	hijacking,	and	indeed Peacocke	wants	to	avoid	it.	He	avoids	condemning	all	illuders	as	unjustified	in believing	their	eyes	by	supplementing	the	Factive	Theory	norm	with	a	clause	linking justification	to	a	"good-faith	effort"	(p.	2).	If	you	take	an	illusory	experience	at	face value	by	forming	a	belief,	he	says,	you	can	still	be	justified	in	holding	this	belief,	even though	you	are	violating	the	Factive	Theory	norm.	In	describing	this	situation,	he writes	"I	may	have	some	justification,	provided	that	I	am	trying	to	conform	to	the norm". Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 21 So	in	the	end,	having	an	epistemically	downgraded	experience	is	said	to	be compatible	with	having	justification	to	take	that	experience	at	face	value.	You	are justified	in	believing	your	eyes,	but	there	remains	a	norm	that	you	are	violating,	and that	violation	epistemically	downgrades	your	experience.	The	justification	must therefore	come	from	a	source	besides	experience	or	any	evidence	experiences	could provide,	and	its	source	is	the	fact	that	you	are	trying	to	conform	to	the	norm. Are	hijacked	subjects	justified	in	holding	beliefs	that	are	based	on	hijacked experiences?	Peacocke	leaves	it	open	whether	they	are	or	not.	His	paradigm	of	the excused	subject	is	the	hologram-seer.	But	by	virtue	of	what	does	the	hologram-seer count	as	trying	to	follow	the	Factive	Theory	norm? The	most	flat-footed	answer	would	make	the	justification-conferring	good-faith effort	implausibly	demanding,	if	it	involved	checking	to	see	whether	the	book	you seem	to	see	is	in	fact	a	book	or	a	hologram,	before	believing	your	eyes,	or	more generally	trying	to	figure	out	whether	one's	experience	is	or	isn't	an	illusion. Since few	people	are	ever	trying	in	this	sense,	on	this	account	the	average	unwitting hologram-seer	would	end	up	with	an	unjustified	belief	that	things	are	as	they appear.	This	result	seems	implausible,	as	in	many	cases	of	illusions,	subjects	who believe	their	eyes	absent	defeaters	and	hijacking	are	justified	in	doing	so,	even though	they	are	not	trying	to	find	out	whether	they	are	genuinely	perceiving	or suffering	an	illusion.	It	also	runs	counter	to	Peacocke's	classification	of	the	case.	All this	suggests	that	the	relevant	account	of	trying	to	conform	to	the	Factive	Theory norm	must	be	both	less	demanding	and	less	straightforward. On	a	less	demanding	account	of	what	it	is	to	try	to	conform	to	the	Factive	Theory norm,	subjects	would	count	as	trying	follow	the	norm	by	default,	and	so	long	they unwittingly	stumble	into	failing	to	comply	with	the	Factive	Theory	norm.	This account	of	trying	would	reinstate	the	phenomenal	conservative	idea	that	absent defeaters,	you	are	justified	in	taking	your	experiences	at	face	value,	with	the	twist that	the	justification	comes	from	the	fact	that	you	are	trying	to	do	something,	rather than	coming	from	your	experience.11	On	this	account,	the	features	that	are	supposed to	justify	the	hologram-seer	in	taking	her	experience	face-value	would	apply	to hijacked	subjects	as	well.	So	both	kinds	of	illuders	would	be	justified	in	taking	their experiences	at	face	value. But	this	account	of	what	it	is	to	try	to	follow	the	Factive	Theory	norm	does	not	fit well	with	what	hijacked	subjects	are	trying	to	do.	On	the	face	of	it,	the	hijacked subjects	are	not	trying	to	trying	to	let	genuine	perceptions	guide	the	formation	of perceptual	belief.	In	some	of	the	core	cases	of	hijacking,	fear	(Jill)	or	desire	(Vivek) are	pulling	the	strings	on	the	construction	of	the	experience.	So	this	rendition	of what	it	is	to	try	to	follow	the	Factive	Theory	norm	won't	respect	the	difference between	the	unwitting	hologram	seer	and	the	hijacked	subjects.	By	contrast,	the Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	can	explain	better	why	the	hijacked	experiences 11	On	phenomenal	conservatism,	see	Pryor	(2000)	and	Huemer	(2007). Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 22 differ	epistemically	from	other	illuders.	It	does	so	by	locating	epistemically significant	relationships	between	prior	outlooks	and	experiences	that	are	congruent with	them. No	doubt	there	are	other	less	demanding	accounts	of	what	it	is	to	try	to	follow	the Factive	Theory	norm,	besides	the	one	that	reinstates	a	variant	of	phenomenal conservatism.	But	any	less	demanding	account	faces	a	general	challenge:	how	is	it possible	to	exclude	experiences	from	contributing	to	the	features	that	are	supposed to	justify	the	perceiver	in	taking	her	experience	at	face	value? It	is	not	possible	to	take	an	experience	at	face	value	while	remaining	blind	or indifferent	to	its	specific	character.	The	hologram-seer	believes	that	there	are	books rather	than	bicycles	in	front	of	her	because	of	the	character	of	her	experience.	To take	an	experience	at	face	value	is	to	be	sensitive	to	its	specific	character	– otherwise	the	subject's	judgments	would	end	up	having	a	different	content.	So	the features	that	make	the	'good	faith	effort'	confer	justification	will	be	tied	inextricably to	the	specific	character	of	the	experience. The	undemanding	versions	of	the	good-faith	effort	thus	seem	to	face	an	internal instability.	They	have	to	include	illusory	experiences	in	the	account	of	what	the good-faith	effort	is,	but	at	the	same	time	they	have	to	exclude	those	same experiences,	because	illusory	experiences	are	all	epistemically	downgraded. This	instability	detracts	from	the	power	of	the	Factive	Theory	norm	to	explain	why perceptual	hijacking	leads	to	epistemic	downgrade.	The	Factive	Theory	norm	is	in the	position	of	either	condemning	too	many	epistemically	innocuous	illusions	as leading	to	unjustified	beliefs,	or	else	of	vindicating	those	beliefs	in	a	way	that	is	at odds	with	the	idea	that	the	experiences	lack	power	to	provide	justification. At	that point,	the	Factive	Theory	picture	has	no	explanation	of	why	perceptual	hijacking downgrade	experiences,	because	its	supplemental	account	of	the	justificationconferring	good-faith	effort	is	at	odds	with	the	existence	of	epistemic	downgrade	in the	relevant	cases. 7.	Which	routes	to	experience	can	generate	knowledge? According	to	Peacocke,	perception	is	initiated	and	"produced	au	fond"	by	the	world, and	not	by	action.	The	part	of	the	world	that	plays	this	role	is	specified	further	in	the notion	of	genuine	perception	that	operates	in	the	Factive	Theory	norm: An	experience	of	a's	being	F	is	a	genuine	perception	iff	it	is	causally	explained in	the	way	distinctive	of	perception	by	the	object	a's	having	the	property	F. As	Peacocke	sees	it,	by	using	this	notion	of	a	genuine	perception,	the	Factive	Theory explains	how	perception	can	generate	knowledge	and	rational	belief.	Genuine perception	enables	you	to	know	that	an	object	a	is	F	because	of	the	direct	causal	role played	by	a's	having	F	in	producing	the	perceptual	experience.	This	account	is Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 23 meant	integrate	with	"empirical	theories	of	perception	that	include	top-down processing	and	predictive	coding",	when	a	genuine	perception	as	of	a's	being	is	F	is "caused	by	a's	being	F	via	good	processes	operating	in	the	circumstances	in	which they	were	evolved	to	operate". Notice	the	emphasis	on	the	causal	role	of	a's	F-ness	in	establishing	the	status	of	an experience	as	a	genuine	perception.	Prior	generalizations	about	a,	or	about	F-ness, or	about	relationships	between	F	and	other	properties	could	have	causal	roles	too	in in	producing	the	experience,	on	this	picture,	but	none	of	them	could	give	an experience	as	of	a's	being	F	the	status	of	a	genuine	perception	without	a	causal	role for	a's	being	F. Let's	say	that	if	a's	being	F	could	have	no	causal	role	in	producing	a	genuine perception	of	a's	being	F,	where	instead	the	genuine	perception	is	produced	by	a mixture	of	other	initial	sensory	inputs	and	generalizations	of	the	sort	just mentioned,	then	the	causal	theory	of	perception	is	"inferential".	The	sense	of "inferential:	here	does	not	build	in	that	the	inference	is	rational.	It	need	not	redound well	or	badly	on	the	subject.	It	just	marks	the	kinds	of	calculations	that	could establish	a	perceptual	relation	between	a	subject	and	a's	being	F.	Peacocke's	picture is	anti-inferential	in	this	sense,	because	it	insists	on	a	causal	role	for	a's	being	F	in	its causal	theory	of	perception. There	are	several	grounds	for	doubting	the	adequacy	of	the	anti-inferential	account of	genuine	perception. First,	it	is	at	odds	with	one	kind	of	role	for	predictions	or	prior	assumptions	in producing	experience.	Suppose	my	stored	knowledge	that	bananas	are	yellow	joins forces	with	the	sensory	input	from	a	yellow	banana,	before	I've	processed	its	color, and	here	the	sensory	input	is	not	sensitive	to	color.	This	banana's	yellowness	(an instance	of	a's	being	F)	might	play	no	causal	role	at	all	in	the	production	of	my experience.	And	yet	it	can	be	rational	to	take	the	experience	of	yellowness	at	face value.	One	could	also	know	that	the	banana	is	yellow,	if	the	processing	is	properly sensitive	to	color	and	mistakes	could	not	easily	be	made. In	a	predictive	processing	framework,	a	role	for	predictions	that	eclipses	any	direct causal	role	for	instances	of	a's	being	F	is	the	norm.	These	theories	would	therefore seem	at	odds	with	the	idea	that	perception	is	caused	"au	fond"	by	a's	being	F. As Clark	(2016)	puts	it,	"the	bulk	of	our	normal,	successful,	daily	perceptual	contact with	the	world	if	the	prediction	machine	models	are	on	the	mark	is	determined	as much	by	our	expectations	concerning	the	sensed	scene	as	by	the	driving	signals themselves." The	anti-inferential	account	of	genuine	perception	likewise	seems	to	disallow object-perception	that	is	initiated	by	scene-perception,	in	which	you	perceive	a's being	F	by	perceiving	a	scene's	being	G	and	calculating	that	a	is	F	because	the	scene is	G.	For	instance,	when	scene-perception	is	primary,	you	perceive	that	there's	a Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 24 rectangular	toaster-shaped	thing	at	a	certain	location	by	perceiving	a	larger	scene and	calculating	that	since	the	scene	is	a	kitchen,	object	a	is	toaster-shaped.	In	that type	of	scenario,	a	genuine	perception	of	a's	being	F	is	initiated	equally	by	another perception	and	a	calculation	of	the	relationship	between	a's	being	F	and	the	scene's being	G.12 The	structure	of	processing	here	differs	from	the	model	Peacocke	describes	in	the case	of	perceiving	concavity.	On	his	analysis,	the	background	assumption	that	light comes	from	above	enables	a	genuine	perception	of	concavity,	by	helping	to	produce an	experience	as	of	"gradual	dark	shading	in	upwards	direction".	It	might	seem	as	if it's	the	property	of	having	that	pattern	of	shading	plus	the	stored	assumption	that light	comes	from	above	that	does	all	the	causal	explaining	of	why	we	experience surface	as	concave,	with	no	role	at	all	for	the	fact	that	the	surface	is	concave.	But Peacocke	suggests	that	the	surface's	concavity	does	play	a	fundamental	causal	role, by	helping	to	explain	why	we	experience	the	pattern	of	shading. This	analysis	brings	a	causal	role	for	concavity	into	focus,	but	it	wouldn't	apply	to scene-first	perception	of	objects,	because	a's	being	a	toaster	does	not	explain	why we	experience	the	scene	as	a	kitchen,	and	need	not	explain	why	we	register	the exact	inputs	that	we	register	from	the	toaster-occupied	region	of	the	kitchen.	We experience	the	scene	as	a	kitchen	because	our	visual	system	has	kept	statistics	on what	kitchens	in	general	look	like. Second,	a	range	of	other	cases	of	perception	have	a	structure	in	which	a	perception of	a's	being	F	generates	rational	belief	and	arguably	knowledge	that	a	is	F,	without the	direct	causal	role	of	a's	being	F	in	generating	the	experience.	These	examples	do not	rely	on	predictive	processing. Consider	the	Kanisza	triangle	[figure].	You	experience	a	triangular	expanse,	but	your triangle-experience	is	caused	by	the	pac-men	mouths	that	define	the	points.	There	is a	triangular	expanse	on	the	page	with	edges	that	are	not	visible.	Due	to	this	expanse, the	content	'it's	a	triangle'	is	true,	and	so	the	experience	is	veridical	and	it	meets	the factive	condition.	Alongside	the	triangle-content,	the	experience	also	has	contents that	are	false,	including	brightness	contrasts	and	depth	illusions. Here,	the	fact	that	there	is	a	triangular	expanse	on	the	surface	does	not	seem	to explain	why	you	experience	the	pac-men,	in	the	way	that	concavity	explains	the upward	pattern	of	dark	shading.	Instead	the	priority	seems	to	go	around	the	other way:	you	experience	a	triangular	expanse	because	you	experience	the	pac-men. Stated	in	the	terms	of	Peacocke's	causal	condition:	the	expanse's	having	the boundaries	of	a	triangle	does	not	cause	the	experience	as	of	the	expanse	having	the boundaries	of	a	triangle.	It	is	therefore	ruled	out	from	being	a	genuine	perception, by	Peacocke's	criterion.	Yet	you	could	come	to	know	that	area	a	is	a	triangle	expanse by	seeing	three	pac-men	on	a	wall	that	form	a	Kanizsa	triangle.	The	Factive	Theory 12	Oliva	and	Torralbo	(2009),	Oliva	(2013) Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 25 norm,	by	using	Peacocke's	criterion	for	genuine	perception,	would	predict	that you're	violating	the	factive	theory	norm	if	you	believe	your	eyes. Figure:	Kanizsa	triangle Another	example	involves	the	experience	of	feeling	a	beat	in	music	or	poetry.	A beat	is	a	local	metric	structure	within	which	you	hear	patterns	of	sounds.	Those sounds	cause	you	to	feel	the	beat	–	not	the	structure	itself.13 By	itself,	the	beat doesn't	sound	like	anything,	and	the	same	sounds	could	be	heard	as	occupying	a different	beat.14	Since	the	metric	structure	does	not	cause	and	therefore	does	not initiate	your	experience	of	the	beat,	it	is	not	a	perception	at	all	according	to	the	antiinferential	construal. Yet	you	could	know	that	the	song	has	the	beat	you	feel	in	it	by taking	your	feeling	at	face	value.	The	move	Peacocke	suggests	in	the	concavity example	does	not	apply	here.	In	that	example,	you	experience	dark	shading	because the	surface	is	concave,	whereas	here,	it's	not	the	case	that	you	hear	the	sounds because	of	the	metric	structure.	The	same	sounds	could	be	heard	in	different	beats (a	point	made	by	Kerr	(ms)). I've	focused	on	a	range	of	routes	to	experience	that	can	generate	knowledge	and reasonable	belief,	and	argued	that	the	anti-inferential	construal	of	genuine perception	used	by	the	Factive	Theory	norm	would	misclassify	these	experiences	as epistemically	inert.	Perhaps	this	misclassification	is	encouraged	by	the	rhetoric	of 'guessing'	that	proponents	of	predictive	processing	sometimes	use	to	characterize their	view.	For	instance,	Clark	writes: 13	Kerr	(ms),	in	a	recent	and	illuminating	discussion	of	feeling	a	beat,	makes	the	case that	the	same	sounds	can	be	felt	in	different	metric	structures. 14	A	beat	is	a	structure,	not	a	property.	But	perhaps	an	instance	of	"a's	being	F"	is: "the	music	has	this	beat". Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 26 "Our	brains	try	to	guess	what's	out	there,	and	to	the	extent	that	that	guess accommodates	(or	as	it	is	sometimes	said	'explains	away')	the	evolving sensory	data,	we	perceive	the	world."	(2016,	p.	14) "If	the	predictive	processing	story	is	on	track,	then	perception	is	indeed	a process	in	which	we	(or	rather,	various	parts	of	our	brains)	try	to	guess	what is	out	there,	using	the	incoming	signal	more	as	a	means	of	tuning	and nuancing	the	guessing	rather	than	as	a	rich	(and	bandwidth-costly)	encoding of	the	state	of	the	world."(2016,	p.	27) Since	you	can't	guess	that	P	when	you	know	that	P,	this	characterization	of perception	as	guessing	would	seem	to	sell	the	predictive	theories	short.	Both	the possibility	that	prediction	globally	shapes	perceptual	experience	and	the phenomena	I've	described	suggest	that	some	routes	to	knowledge-generating experiences	get	their	epistemic	power	in	part	from	the	mind's	stored	assumptions and	the	relationship	of	those	assumptions	to	experiences.	In	short,	some	routes	to experience	are	intelligent.	The	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	gives	us epistemological	framework	for	understanding	intelligent	relationships	between perception	and	prior	outlooks. I've	argued	that	the	anti-inferential	notion	of	genuine	perception	used	by	the	Factive Theory	wrongly	excludes	a	range	of	routes	to	experience	from	the	class	of	genuine perceptions	and	(going	with	that)	as	perceptual	sources	of	knowledge	and	rational belief.	In	this	way,	the	Factive	Theory	does	not	integrate	well	with	empirical theories	that	allow	top-down	effects	on	perception.	By	contrast,	when	such	theories are	combined	with	the	epistemological	analysis	offered	by	the	Rationality	of Perception	thesis,	the	result	is	a	better	account	of	which	routes	to	experience	can yield	knowledge. Bibliography W.	Chase	and	H.	Simon	(1973)	Perception	in	Chess.	Cognitive	Psychology	(4),	51-84. M.	Chirimuuta	(2018)	"Comment	on	Siegel:	Epistemic	Charge	and	the	Problem	of Hijacked	Experience"	Analytic	Philosophy C.	Peacocke	(this	issue) A.	Clark	(2016)	Surfing	Uncertainty:	Prediction,	Action,	and	the	Embodied	Mind.	New York:	Oxford	University	Press. Huemer,	M.	(2007)	"Compassionate	Phenomenal	Conservatism"	Philosophy	and Phenomenological	Research	LXXIV	No.	1,	31-55. R.	Jardi	and	S.	Deneve	(2013)	"Circular	inferences	in	schizophrenia".	Brain.	Nov	136 (Pf	11):	3227-41. J.	Joyce	(2005)	"How	Probabilities	Reflect	Evidence"	Philosophical	Perspectives	19, Epistemology. A.	Kerr	(ms)	Feeling	a	Beat. A.	Oliva	and	A.	Torralba	(2009)	"The	Role	of	Context	in	Object	Recognition"	Trends in	Cognitive	Science	Vol	11,	No.	12.	520-27. Susanna	Siegel	*	To	appear	in	Res	Philosophica,	2018 27 A.	Oliva (2013)	"Scene	Perception"	in	T.	Werner	and	M.	Chalupa	The	New	Visual Neurosciences.	MIT	Press.	725-32. Peacocke,	C.	(1998)	Being	Known.	Oxford	University	Press. J.	Pryor	(2000)	"The	Skeptic	and	the	Dogmatist"	Nous	34:4	(517-49). G.	Sotiropoulos,	Seitz,	A.,	Seriès,	P.	2011.	"Changing	Expectations	about	Speed	Alters Perceived	Motion	Direction."	Current	Biology	21:	R883-R88. J.	Vance	(2015)	"Cognitive	Penetration	and	the	Tribunal	of	Experience"	in	Review	of Philosophy	and	Psychology,	eds.	Z.	Jenkin	and	S.	Siegel.